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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SECTION 301 LABOR ARBITRATION
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION CLAIMS: THE
EFFECT OF COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
INTRODUCTION
In 1960, the Supreme Court established federal labor arbitration policy
in three cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy.I Under the Trilogy, the
contractual promise to arbitrate disputes over the meaning and applica-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement limits the role of the federal
judiciary in reviewing the labor-management relationship,2 as the merits
of a party's grievance are to be determined by the arbitrator The arbi-
trator's findings and award are to be enforced by a court, in the absence
of a judicial determination that the award does not "drawf- its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement."'
As part of her award an arbitrator may grant coercive relief, intending
that the award have a prospective effect.5 In granting such relief, the
arbitrator seeks to prevent similar conduct in the future, conduct that she
1. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
2. See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568. In the Trilogy, the Court developed its
policy of judicial deference to arbitration based on similar Congressional intent. See id. at
566. Section 203 of the Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hart-
ley Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, provides: "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collec-
tive-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
3. See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568. A court usurps the role of the arbitrator
when it interprets a substantive portion of the collective bargaining agreement in an at-
tempt to determine the parties' rights and duties under the agreement. See id. at 569.
Arbitration is preferred to litigation or other confrontational attempts at conflict reso-
lution because it relieves the parties of their adversarial tendencies. See id. at 567; Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. General Elec. Co., 865 F.2d 902,
903 (7th Cir. 1989). The arbitration clause is the quidpro quo for a "no-strike" clause in
a collective bargaining agreement. See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567. "A major
factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of griev-
ances in the collective bargaining agreement." Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
at 578. Consequently, arbitrators, selected by the parties for their experience and knowl-
edge of the bargaining relationship, should resolve all arbitrable disputes under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. See id. at 582-83.
4. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
Although an arbitrator's award must draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement, an arbitrator is to be given great deference in fashioning remedies. See United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
5. See, eg., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl
Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (arbitrator prohibited future
"like" violations of the collective bargaining agreement); International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 670
F. Supp. 917, 918 (N.D. Okla. 1987) (arbitrator ordered management to cease and desist
from engaging in similar violations of the collective bargaining agreement).
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has determined violates the collective bargaining agreement.' If such
conduct occurs after the award, the aggrieved party may file a claim pur-
suant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act7
("LMRA") in federal district court seeking to enforce the prior arbitra-
tion award in the new dispute.'
To enforce an award in a new dispute, a court must determine that the
second dispute is factually similar to the first. There are currently sev-
eral schools of thought regarding the measure of factual identity neces-
sary in prospective application claims. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit requires that a party requesting prospective application
demonstrate that the new dispute is "substantially identical" to prior dis-
putes. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a court
must defer prospective application to an arbitrator unless it can say with
"positive assurance" that the prior dispute is factually similar to the pres-
ent dispute. ° The Fifth Circuit's material factual identity standard re-
quires a party to demonstrate that the facts in the present dispute are not
materially different from those that gave rise to the prior dispute.11
This Note argues in favor of the material factual identity standard
based on the Supreme Court's reaffirmance, in AT&T Technologies, Inc.
v. Communications Workers,12 of the judiciary's role in interpreting col-
lective bargaining agreements. Part I reviews the Court's reliance on the
law of contract in the collective bargaining relationship and the resulting
expansion of the judicial role in labor arbitration after Communications
Workers. Part II examines the requirement that a party bringing a pro-
spective application claim demonstrate that the prior award clearly and
unambiguously provides for prospective application. Having found such
arbitral intent, a court must determine whether there is the requisite fac-
tual identity between the two disputes to warrant prospective application.
Part III examines the split on the measure of factual identity, concluding
6. See Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1047; Rockwell Int'l Corp., 670 F. Supp. at 918.
Coercive relief is often granted where management has breached its promises under the
agreement, damaging the union and its membership. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at
1047 (management placed supervisory and salaried personnel in hourly-rated positions);
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 670 F. Supp. at 918 (management hired non-union employees to
perform work reserved for union employees under collective bargaining agreement).
7. Section 301 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce... may be brought
in [a] district court of the United States....
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
8. See Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1047.
9. See Local 1545, United Mine Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288,
1295 (7th Cir. 1989); United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d
1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1975).
10. See United Mine Workers Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806,
811 (3d Cir. 1981).
11. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).
12. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
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that the Fifth Circuit's material factual identity standard is most
appropriate.
I. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE LABOR ARBITRATION
SYSTEM: THE LAW OF CONTRACT
The bargaining relationship is usually based on a collective bargaining
agreement, which is a contract. The parties to a collective bargaining
agreement may limit their duty to arbitrate disputes,13 just as the parties
to a contract may limit their duties under that contract. Based on their
conflicting interpretations of the agreement's arbitration provisions, the
parties may disagree as to which disputes are arbitrable. Unless the par-
ties clearly provide otherwise, a court, not an arbitrator, settles any dis-
pute concerning arbitrability, for arbitrators are not permitted to
determine their own jurisdiction.4
In Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the Supreme Court
held that judicial resolution of arbitrability disputes should be governed
by a presumption of arbitrability.15 A dispute should be remanded to
arbitration unless the court can say "with positive assurance that the ar-
bitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the as-
serted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. "16
13. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578,
582 (1960). Approximately 13 percent of all arbitration clauses contain language limiting
the scope of arbitrable disputes. See Basic Patterns in Union Contracts 37 (1 lth ed.
1986).
For examples of narrow arbitration provisions, see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, Local 7-1 v. Amoco Oil Co., 883 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1989) (clause limited
arbitration to issues directly involving or arising from prior arbitration proceeding); In-
ternational Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. General Elec. Co., 865 F.2d
902, 904 (7th Cir. 1989) ("unusually narrow" arbitration limitations); Lehigh Portland
Cement Co. v. Cement, Lime, Gypsum, & Allied Workers Division, Int'l Bhd. of Boiler-
makers, 849 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1988) (arbitration clause limited initiation of arbitra-
tion proceedings solely to union grievances; therefore, employer could bring grievances
directly to federal district court); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Work-
ers v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 829 F.2d 658, 659 (8th Cir. 1987) (arbitration clause pro-
hibited rearbitration of issues previously settled through arbitration).
14. See Communications Workers, 475 U.S. at 651; International Union of Operating
Engineers Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491 (1972); John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370
U.S. 238, 241 (1962); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
For examples of arbitration clauses that delegate arbitrability disputes to an arbitrator,
see United Food & Commercial Workers, Locals 770, 889, & 1442 v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
806 F.2d 1385, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) ("there is no room for a court to get involved" where
parties to a collective bargaining agreement provide that arbitrability should be deter-
mined by an arbitrator); International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139 v. Carl
A. Morse, Inc., 529 F.2d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 1976) ("unusual" clause in collective bargain-
ing agreement granted arbitrator power to resolve arbitrability disputes); International
Union of Petroleum & Industrial Workers v. Marathon Oil Co., 549 F. Supp. 1080, 1081
(E.D. Cal. 1982) ("issue of arbitrability shall first be determined by an impartial
arbitrator").
15. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
16. Id.
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In 1986, the Supreme Court reevaluated its emphasis on the "pre-
sumption of arbitrability."' 7 In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communica-
tions Workers,18  the Court deemphasized the "presumption of
arbitrability" in favor of a more comprehensive judicial investigation of
arbitrability disputes based on contract interpretation.' 9 Rather than
presume that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement intend to
arbitrate the dispute, courts are to interpret the substantive portions of
the agreement to determine whether the parties intended to submit the
dispute to an arbitrator.2 °
In the Trilogy, the Court took exception to the view that the collective
bargaining agreements are simply contracts.2 In Warrior & Gulf, the
Supreme Court stated that the collective bargaining agreement "is more
than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."' 22 The current Court has
not repudiated the Warrior & Gulf Court's perspective on collective bar-
gaining agreements. In Communications Workers, however, the Court
reemphasized the contractual nature of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and expanded the permissible level of judicial scrutiny of the agree-
ment based on traditional notions of contract law.23 Because
17. See Note, Arbitration After Communication Workers: A Diminished Role?, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 1313-14 (1987).
18. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
19. See id. at 651.
20. See id.; Teamsters Local 315 v. Union Oil Co., 856 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 869 (1989); see also Note, supra note 17, at 1313 (after
Communications Workers, "courts must decide arbitrability issues even at the risk of in-
volvement in the merits").
21. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
22. Id.
23. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651
(1986).
The Supreme Court has reviewed the judicial role in enforcement claims in a similar
manner. Under the Trilogy, should a party refuse to conform to an arbitration award, the
opposing party may bring suit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
to enforce the arbitrator's award. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). A court must enforce
the award as long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. See
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). A court
may, however, vacate an award upon evidence of fraud or dishonesty involving the arbi-
trator. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
A court should be less deferential when an award has public policy implications. In
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a court should not
enforce a collective bargaining agreement provision that conflicts with public policy. See
id. at 766. If a contract, as interpreted by an arbitrator in her award, violates "some
explicit public policy" it should not be enforced. See id. "Such... public policy.., must
be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.'" Id. at 766
(quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). When such a violation is
alleged, a court should determine whether the award violates a statutory or constitutional
1292 [Vol. 58
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management usually initiates arbitrability disputes,24 the federal judici-
ary's expanded role in such disputes gives management a potent weapon
in its struggles with labor.2"
II. THE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LABOR
ARBITRATION AWARDS
An arbitrator may limit the conduct of the parties by providing coer-
cive relief, such as a cease and desist order.26 If such an order is granted,
and the party subject to the order commits a similar violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, a court may be called upon under section
301 of the LMRA27 to enforce the arbitrator's award in the new
right. See Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel
Goes Around and Around, 52 Mo. L. Rev. 243, 261 (1987).
The policy of vacating or refusing enforcement of arbitral awards repugnant to public
policy is grounded in the common law of contract. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987). It is the court's function to protect the public
interest and, consequently, a court should "abrogate private agreements" that violate that
interest. See id. After Grace, the federal judiciary should review enforcement claims
with an eye to external principles of contract law. In Grace, the majority cited both the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement Second of Contracts in its analysis of
the parties' relationship. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 768
n.12, 769 n.13 (1983). Although it rejected the plaintiff's claim, the Grace Court recog-
nized management's cause of action, opening the federal judiciary to a further wave of
section 301 activity. See Heinsz, supra, at 266; Wayland, Stephens & Franklin, Misco-
Its Impact on Arbitration Awards, 39 Lab. L.J. 813, 816 (Dec. 1988).
24. See M. Grossman, The Question of Arbitrability 4 (1984); see also Gould, Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards - Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The
Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 464, 483 (1989) (union initiates
most grievances and contends for arbitrability in most arbitrability disputes); Note, supra
note 17, at 1315 (Communications Workers analysis equated to an "unshackling of man-
agement"). The exception to the proposition would naturally be where the union has
gone out on strike and management brings a section 301 action to enjoin the strike and
enforce the union's promise to arbitrate. See M. Grossman, supra, at 4. The union then
might refuse to arbitrate, contending that the dispute is not arbitrable under the collective
bargaining agreement. See id.
25. See Note, supra note 17, at 1318-19.
As a result of the Court's analysis in Communications Workers, there has been a dra-
matic increase in arbitrability litigation. See Gould, supra note 24, at 472, 475. Contrac-
tual interpretation is a question of law. See International Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. General Elec. Co., 865 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1989). Therefore,
appellate review is plenary. See id. (accepting the proposition, but noting that "it is not
obvious why the old practice of plenary ('de novo') appellate review of contract interpre-
tation should persist"). Consequently, the circuit courts have had to review more arbi-
trability disputes as well.
26. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981); International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 670 F. Supp. 917,
918 (N.D. Okla. 1987); see also M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, Remedies in Arbitration 174
(1981) ("If the parties [to an arbitration proceeding] specifically request a cease-and-de-
sist order.., the better weight of authority is to incorporate such a 'remedy' into the
award if the facts so warrant.").
27. Section 301 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
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dispute.2 s
A. Intent of the Arbitrator
An arbitration award may be enforced only as written.2 9 Absent lan-
guage indicating the arbitrator's clear and unambiguous intention to pre-
vent similar conduct by the offending party, the prior award will not be
applied prospectively.3" If prospective enforcement would require inter-
pretation of the arbitrator's award, the dispute should be remanded to
the arbitrator for clarification.31
Prospective enforcement of an arbitration award lacking prospective
intent usurps the arbitrator's role in violation of the principles of judicial
deference set forth in the Trilogy.3" Expanding the scope of an award by
representing employees in an industry affecting commere ... may be brought
in [a] district court of the United States....
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
28. In the wake of the arbitration policy adopted in the Trilogy, a court must not
determine the rights of the parties under the collective bargaining agreement, with the
lone exception of the parties' rights under the agreement's arbitration provisions. See
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960). Therefore, it
might appear as if the Court has repudiated prospective application of arbitration awards.
However, if a court refuses to apply the prior award prospectively, it undermines the
importance the Trilogy places on the arbitral system as a method of keeping industrial
peace. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044, 1048-49, 1049 n.8 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981); see also Boston Shipping Ass'n
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981) (petitioner argued
that permitting union to ignore prior award would "make the arbitration a sham and
trivialize arbitral dispute resolution").
If an arbitrator is given the flexibility to govern the labor-management relationship, in
conformity with the mandate of the collective bargaining agreement, a court should en-
force his award when appropriate. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). "Once [a cease and desist order] is issued, if the breach-
ing party continues to ignore the order, the award may be enforced in a subsequent court
proceeding." M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, supra note 26, at 174.
29. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-367 v. Rohm & Haas,
Texas Inc., 677 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1982).
30. See Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 491 (1st Cir. 1983);
Rohm & Haas, 677 F.2d at 495; see also United Mine Workers Dist. No. 5 v. Consolida-
tion Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981) (court must be able to say with positive
assurance that arbitrator intended award have prospective effect). The Seventh Circuit
has developed a similar analysis. The court requires a party seeking prospective applica-
tion to demonstrate that it had sought coercive relief in the prior arbitration. See United
Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1975). If
the party did not request coercive relief in the prior arbitration proceeding, the court
should deny prospective enforcement and remand the dispute to arbitration. See id. If
the party requested coercive relief but was rejected, the court should find that the arbitra-
tor did not intend his award to have a prospective effect, and, therefore, the claim should
be denied. See Local 1545, United Mine Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d
1288, 1295 (7th Cir. 1989).
31. See Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d at 810; Boston Shipping Ass'n v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981); Midwest Lodge No. 2063,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Admiral Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 587
F. Supp. 1563, 1566 (C.D. Ill. 1984).
32. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-367 v. Rohm & Haas,
Texas Inc., 677 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1982).
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applying it to future disputes makes that award "precedential." 33 An
award's precedential effect, its worth in a stare decisis or res judicata
sense, must be determined by an arbitrator and not a court.34
Therefore, a court must distinguish a suit to enforce a prior award
prospectively from an attempt to preclude a party's grievance from arbi-
tration based on notions of resjudicata or stare decisis. In the former
instance, a party seeks to enforce a prior arbitration award in a subse-
quent dispute. 6 In the latter context, a party whose position was vindi-
cated in a prior award seeks to prevent another arbitration involving an
interpretation of the same clause of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.37 Where a party seeks judicial assistance in granting an award res
judicata or stare decisis effect, a court should reject the claim and return
the parties to arbitration38 in order to avoid infringing on the arbitrator's
role.39 A party can present before the arbitrator the same argument it
would before a judge, that the prior arbitration award should have res
judicata or stare decisis effect on the present proceedings.' °
33. See New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, Local 1418, 626 F.2d
455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nor. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals,
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982); see also National Eleva-
tor Indus., Inc. v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 647 F. Supp. 976, 979
(S.D. Tex. 1986) (arbitrator limited scope of award to wage reduction program at one
plant; thus, court should not geographically expand scope of award for such order would
impose resjudicata effect on future proceedings), aff'd, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985).
34. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 199 v. United Tel. Co., 738 F.2d
1564, 1571 (1lth Cir. 1984); Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11,
702 F.2d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 1983); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-
367 v. Rohm & Haas, Texas Inc., 677 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1982); Boston Shipping
Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981); New Orleans
S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, Local 1418, 626 F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982). Also, a court should not "second-guess" an arbi-
trator's determination of a prior award's precedential effect. See W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 765
(1983).
35. See National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 606 F.
Supp. 111, 114 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
36. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981); International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 670 F. Supp. 917,
918 (N.D. Okla. 1987).
37. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 199 v. United Tel. Co., 738 F.2d
1564, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1984); Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Local Union
No. 8332, 701 F.2d 26, 27 (4th Cir. 1983).
38. See United TeL Co., 738 F.2d at 1572; Little Six Corp., 701 F.2d at 29.
39. See United Tel. Co., 738 F.2d at 1572 n.11. But see Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d
331, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring NLRB to give precedential effect to an arbitra-
tor's prior interpretation of a clause in the collective bargaining agreement: "The whole
function of arbitration as a 'vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement' would be impaired if the parties could not rely on a settled
construction of their agreement." (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960)).
40. See United Tel. Co., 738 F.2d at 1572; Little Six Corp., 701 F.2d at 29. The
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In Boston Shipping Association v. International Longshoremen's Associ-
ation,4 ' the First Circuit provided an alternative to the arbitral intent
requirement.42 Chief Judge Coffin held that a prior arbitration award
should have prospective effect even though it was not "expressly directed
at future 'like' violations."43 Because the dispute did not arise from a
"discrete historical incident but rather the definition of a physical loca-
tion, . . . the award was inherently prospective."' The First Circuit's
approach suggests that in order to have a prospective effect, a prior
award need not be clearly directed at future violations of the collective
bargaining agreement.45
By holding that an award is "inherently prospective" when it is silent
as to its prospective effect, the First Circuit infringed on the arbitrator's
role and thereby ignored the Trilogy's mandate of deference to the arbi-
tral system.' Precedential effect should not be imposed upon an arbitra-
tion award when neither that award nor the collective bargaining
agreement under which it was rendered contains language supporting
such an imposition.47
processing of even frivolous claims through arbitration may have a therapeutic effect on
the labor-management relationship, a result that judicial response may not be able to
render. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); Boston
Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981).
Arbitrators themselves are not required to conform to a prior arbitrator's interpreta-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement unless language in a collective bargaining agree-
ment requires conformity. See Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No.
11, 702 F.2d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478,
483-84 (3d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); Westinghouse Elevators of P. R., Inc.
v. SIU, 583 F.2d 1184, 1187 (1st Cir. 1978); Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Execu-
tive Bd., 578 F.2d 250, 251 (9th Cir. 1978); see also F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, How
Arbitration Works 430-33 (1985) (detailing use of "persuasive" prior awards as precedent
by arbitrators). An arbitrator is free to depart from the holding of a prior award if rigid
adherence to that award would impair the flexibility of the arbitral process. See Courier-
Citizen Co., 702 F.2d at 280.
41. 659 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). In Boston Shipping, a 1980 arbitration proceeding had
resolved a dispute concerning the dimensions of Berth 13 at the Castle Island terminal
facility, a determination that affected manning requirements under Article 12 of the par-
ties' 1977-1980 collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 2.
42. See id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See Midwest Lodge No. 2063, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Admiral Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1563, 1566 (C.D. Il. 1984) (dismissing
the "inherently prospective" doctrine, because "[iun the absence of language in the prior
arbitration award directing prospective application, the issue of whether the award
should be prospectively applied is appropriately one for an arbitrator to decide").
47. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 199 v. United Tel. Co., 738 F.2d
1564, 1571 (11th Cir. 1984); Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11,
702 F.2d 273, 280 (1st Cir. 1983); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-
367 v. Rohm & Haas, Texas Inc., 677 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1982); New Orleans S.S.
Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, Local 1418, 626 F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982); supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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The dangers of the "inherently prospective" doctrine become apparent
by reviewing lower court responses. In Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v.
International Chemical Workers,48 a prior arbitration award had deter-
mined the seniority rights of union members.49 Due to an arbitration
provision rendering all arbitral decisions "final and binding," Baldwin
held that the prior award was "inherently prospective."50 The court
went further, holding that it could not rule as to the award's prospective
effect, and deferred that question to the arbitrator. 1 The company, how-
ever, would not be allowed to contest the arbitrator's interpretation of
the contract, nor could it argue for a different construction of the con-
tract in a subsequent arbitration proceeding. 2 Thus, the decision essen-
tially prohibited any further arbitration involving the seniority provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement.
The result in Baldwin Piano clearly infringes on the Trilogy's policy of
deference to arbitration. 3 As noted in the Trilogy, the flexibility of the
arbitral process preserves the tranquility of the labor-management rela-
tionship. 4 Limiting labor or management's ability to invoke arbitration
on res judicata or stare decisis5" grounds sacrifices this essential
flexibility.
B. The Effect of the Intent Requirement on Labor and Management
A judicial aversion to prospective application, absent language indicat-
ing such judicial action was the intent of the arbitrator, has a beneficial
practical effect on the labor-management relationship. The parties
should submit all issues that they wish to have resolved to the arbitra-
tor.56 If labor or management desires prospective enforcement, they
should argue for a coercive remedy during the initial arbitration proceed-
ing.57 If labor and management wish to limit an arbitrator's power to
grant such coercive remedies, they may do so through their collective
48. 564 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Miss. 1983).
49. See id. at 1271.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1272. The court stated: "It is, of course, unresolved at this stage of the
matter in federal court whether the provisions of the contract have been violated by Bald-
win or a grievant employee. These questions are not to be determined by this court; they
must be remanded to the arbitrator for disposition." Id.
52. See id.
53. See Howan, The Prospective Effect ofArbitration, 7 Indus. Rel. L.J. 60, 80 (1985).
54. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
55. See Howan, supra note 53, at 80. See generally Automotive, Petroleum & Allied
Indus. Employees Union, Local 618 v. Gelco Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (E.D. Mo.
1984) (plaintiff free to argue before the arbitrator that prior award should be given
preclusive effect).
56. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-367 v. Rohm & Haas,
Texas Inc., 677 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1982) (district court opinion in appendix to case).
57. See Local 1545, United Mine Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288,
1295 (7th Cir. 1989); United Transp. Union v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 754 F.2d 525,
526 (4th Cir. 1985).
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bargaining agreement and its arbitration clause.5
Prospective application of an award under these circumstances recog-
nizes the intentions of both the parties and the arbitrator reviewing their
relationship. The arbitrator will have fashioned an appropriate coercive
remedy based on her findings of fact and her interpretation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.59 More importantly, an unwillingness to ap-
ply prospectively an award lacking prospective intent will motivate the
parties to raise before an arbitrator the prospect of a coercive remedy
should they desire such relief.'° Under these circumstances, a court af-
firms rather than usurps the arbitrator's role in labor arbitration.6"
III. FACTUAL IDENTITY
Judicial investigation does not end with a determination of an arbitra-
tor's prospective intent. Some measure of factual identity must be found
between the dispute that gave rise to the prior arbitration award and the
dispute in the case at bar.62 There is widespread disagreement concern-
ing the proper measure of factual identity in prospective application
claims.63
A. Substantial Identity Standard
The Seventh Circuit presented its substantial identity standard in
United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers v. Honeywell Inc. Under
the Honeywell standard, the moving party must demonstrate that the fac-
tual basis of the prior arbitration award is "substantially identical" to the
grievance in the case at bar.65 The Seventh Circuit refused prospective
58. See M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, supra note 26, at 6; see also Inland Steel Coal Co., 876
F.2d at 1295 (language in arbitration clause stating that arbitrator's decision "shall gov-
ern only the dispute before him" limited arbitrator's authority to grant coercive
remedies).
59. See M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, supra note 26, at 22-23.
60. See, e.g., Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d at 1295 (court refused to prospectively
apply prior award where plaintiff did not request coercive relief in prior proceeding);
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 754 F.2d at 526 (same).
61. See International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 670 F. Supp. 917, 920 (N.D. Okla. 1987). But see
Howan, supra note 53, at 77-79 (arguing that prospective application, no matter what
standard is applied in the analysis, necessarily infringes on the role of the arbitrator under
the Trilogy).
62. See Local 1545, United Mine Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288,
1295 (7th Cir. 1989); United Mine Workers Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666
F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000
v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981); United Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1975).
63. See Inland Steel, 876 F.2d at 1293-94.
64. 522 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975).
65. See id. at 1226.
In Honeywell, the union brought a section 301 action against defendant company seek-
ing prospective application of a 1973 arbitration award. See id. at 1224. The award
found management's placement of non-unit personnel in positions normally occupied by
unit employees in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 1223-24.
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application in Honeywell, finding that the union had "failed to allege at
least three circumstances which would be basic to any judicial relief from
a contractual duty to arbitrate."" First, the union failed to aggregate its
grievances, which challenged management's right to subcontract work,
in one arbitration proceeding.67 Second, the union neglected to request
coercive relief in the prior arbitration proceedings.68 Finally, the union
did not allege that the four prior disputes were "substantially identical"
to the grievances in the case at bar.6 9 Under this test, the moving party
must demonstrate "that the factual basis of the [prior] awards in its favor
[are] so nearly identical to the facts of the pending grievances that [man-
agement's] conduct constitutes wilful and persistent disregard of the arbi-
tration awards." 70
The substantial identity standard is faulty in two respects.71 First, the
standard is ambiguous. The Seventh Circuit made no effort to specify
exactly what constitutes "substantially identical" factual scenarios. The
ambiguity in the Honeywell analysis was a result of the nature of its re-
view; the Seventh Circuit court did not apply its standard to the facts of
the case at bar. Because the union failed to allege any factual identity in
its petition for reversal of the district court's order, Honeywell did not
provide a mode of analysis that might clarify its standard.72 It simply
held that the union failed to-allege substantial factual identity, factual
identity sufficient to constitute wilful and persistent disregard of a prior
arbitration award.73
The Seventh Circuit's recent evaluation of the substantial identity
standard in Local 1545, United Mine Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co.7 4
The union complained that management had subsequently violated the collective bar-
gaining agreement in a similar manner over one hundred times. See id. at 1224. The
court was not unsympathetic to the union's cause of action. "We agree that permitting
courts to intervene [where an employer wilfully and persistently disregards a prior arbi-
tration award] might... further the national arbitration policy." Id. at 1225. However,
the court denied application under the facts of the case. See id.
66. Id. at 1228.
67. See id. at 1226.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1227.
71. The inherent problem with the Honeywell substantial identity standard can be
traced to the Seventh Circuit's approach to prospective application claims. The court
believed that by prospectively applying a prior arbitration award a court would be re-
quired to carve out an exception to the Steelworkers Trilogy's policy of deference to arbi-
tration. See United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d 1221,
1222 (7th Cir. 1975). It is clear, however, that prospective application, under proper
circumstances, does not usurp, but affirms the arbitrator's role in labor arbitration. See
supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
72. The district court had dismissed the union's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
See Honeywell, 522 F.2d at 1222-23. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit assumed that the
allegations of the union were true in reviewing the propriety of the district court's order.
See id. at 1223.
73. See id. at 1227.
74. 876 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1989).
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failed to resolve the confusion. In Inland Steel, the union alleged facts
that met the substantial identity standard.75 The Seventh Circuit held,
however, that the union had failed to allege facts sufficient to support a
finding that management's conduct constituted wilful and persistent dis-
regard of the prior awards.7 6 But under Honeywell, having satisfied the
substantial identity standard, the union would have triggered a judicial
determination that management had wilfully and persistently disre-
garded the prior award." The result in Inland Steel demonstrates that
the substantial identity standard breeds confusion and inconsistent
results.78
Second, "substantial identity" impliedly provides for an overly strict
standard of review. Although the Seventh Circuit has not provided a
mode of analysis under its standard, it did give an example of conduct
that would not be "substantially similar." In its example in Honeywell,
the court indicated that a change in the employee or type of product
involved in the current dispute would warrant a denial of prospective
application of the prior award. 79 A change in the type of product or in
the employee bringing the grievance, however, should not warrant a re-
fusal to enforce a prior award that was intended by its author to apply
prospectively. In the latter case, an arbitrator has already interpreted a
clause in the collective bargaining agreement so that the parties under-
stand their respective rights and duties under that clause. The arbitra-
tor's coercive remedy states that those rights and duties are to apply
prospectively during the term of the parties' collective bargaining rela-
tionship. An immaterial factual discrepancy changes neither the arbitra-
tor's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement nor his grant
75. See id. at 1295-96.
76. See id.
77. See United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1227
(7th Cir. 1975).
78. It is interesting to note that on three separate occasions since the Seventh Circuit
adopted its standard in Honeywell, district courts within the Seventh Circuit completely
ignored the Honeywell analysis when reviewing prospective application claims. See Local
1545, United Mine Workers v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1294 (7th Cir.
1989) (relying on the Third Circuit's "with positive assurance" standard); District 12,
United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 602 F. Supp. 240,243 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (same);
Midwest Lodge No. 2063, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Admiral
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1563, 1566-67 (C.D. Ill. 1984) (same).
79. See United Elee. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1227
(7th Cir. 1975). The court stated:
A[n arbitration award] holding that the Company may not subcontract the
work of toolroom employees does not answer the question of whether the con-
struction of Tool # I is a task normally performed by the bargaining unit.
Nor, would a holding that the manufacture of Tool # 1 may not be subcon-
tracted tell the Company that it could not assign the manufacture of Tool # 2
to workers outside the bargaining unit unless it was clear that Tool # 1 and
Tool # 2 differed from one another only in a manner or manners insignificant
in determining the applicability of Article I [of the collective bargaining
agreement].
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of prospective effect. Conduct that merely differs in form from the ac-
tions that were the subject of the prior arbitration award should not jus-
tify refusing prospective application. 0 The Seventh Circuit's intimation
that such a change would warrant dismissal suggests that the Seventh
Circuit's standard would be unreasonably strict.
This flaw is further evidenced by the court's mistaken impression that
prospective application is similar to resjudicata,s1 which requires "strict
factual identity" for application. 2 A decision applying a "strict factual
identity" standard denies prospective enforcement unless the exact dis-
pute that gave rise to the prior arbitration duplicates itself8s3 Such a
standard effectively eliminates any possibility of prospective applica-
tion. 4 The Seventh Circuit's requirement of substantial factual identity
tips precariously close to "strict factual identity" and should not be
applied.
B. "Positive Assurance" Standard
The Third Circuit announced its "positive assurance" standard in
United Mine Workers District No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co. 5 Under
the standard, a court should deny enforcement and return the parties to
arbitration unless it holds with "positive assurance" that the prior award
was intended to cover the dispute at hand. 6 Consolidation Coal ap-
proached prospective application as an issue of arbitrability, noting that
the Trilogy required deference to the arbitral system. 7
The "positive assurance" standard incorporates both requirements of
prospective application analysis: arbitral intent and factual identity.
First, the judge must be able to say with positive assurance that the arbi-
trator intended his award have a prospective effect.88 Second, the court
80. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).
81. See Honeywell, 522 F.2d at 1228.
82. See id.
83. See Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1054.
84. See generally id. at 1054-55 ("strict factual identity standard" is too slippery, and
is not "proper path on which to proceed" in prospective application claims).
85. 666 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1981).
86. See id. at 811.
87. See id. The court stated the standard as follows:
Federal courts are bound to exercise the utmost restraint to avoid intruding on
the bargained-for method of dispute resolution and when enforcement of an
arbitration award ... is sought under Section 301, the court must be able to say
"with positive assurance" that the award.., was intended to cover the dispute.
If the court has any doubt, the parties should be returned to their grievance
procedure and arbitration, for it is an arbitrator, and not the court, who is to
decide whether the same issue has already been resolved in an earlier
proceeding.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. See id.; United Mine Workers Dist. 28 v. VP-5 Mining Co., 630 F. Supp. 1210,
1215 (W.D. Va. 1986); District 12, United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 602 F.
Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. Ill. 1985); Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int'l Union Local 3-903
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must be able to say with positive assurance that the new dispute was
intended to be the subject of the arbitrator's grant of prospective relief. 9
Therefore, the court must determine the factual similarity between the
past and present disputes and be able to say with positive assurance that
they are sufficiently similar to apply the prior award prospectively.9"
In Consolidation Coal, the Third Circuit took great care to recognize
the Trilogy's policy of judicial deference to the parties' bargained-for
method of dispute resolution.9" The opinion adopted the language of
Warrior & Gulf and its presumption of arbitrability in formulating its
"positive assurance" standard.92 Under Warrior & Gulf there is a pre-
sumption that all disputes are arbitrable. Therefore, under the Third
Circuit's "positive assurance" standard, there is a presumption that a
prior award is not intended to apply prospectively, and that the facts of
the case at bar are different from those that gave rise to the earlier griev-
ance.93 Absent a court's positive assurance that these presumptions have
been overcome, the parties must be returned to arbitration.94
Warrior & Gulf's "positive assurance" standard, however, has lost
favor in the Supreme Court. In Communications Workers, the Court
withdrew its reliance on the Warrior & Gulf presumption of arbi-
trability.95 A court is to resolve arbitrability disputes by interpreting the
arbitration clause and other substantive portions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.96
Similarly, a judicial analysis of prospective application claims should
not be tainted by a presumption that a prior award does not clearly indi-
cate its prospective effect. In addition, there should be no presumption
that two factual scenarios are different. Instead, there should be more
v. Great Lakes Research Corp., 568 F. Supp. 772, 774 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d
141 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Midwest Lodge No. 2063, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aero-
space Workers v. Admiral Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1563, 1566 (C.D. Ill.
1984) (ambiguity in prior award requires deferral to arbitrator).
89. See United Mine Workers Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806,
811 (3d Cir. 1981).
90. See id.; see also United Mine Workers, Dist. 4 v. Cyprus Emerald Resources
Corp., 681 F. Supp. 271, 278-79 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (analyzing the Third Circuit's "positive
assurance" standard); District 12, United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 602 F.
Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. InI. 1985) (same); Midwest Lodge, 587 F. Supp. at 1566 (same);
Great Lakes Research, 568 F. Supp. at 774 (same).
91. See Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d at 811.
92. See id. at 811 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); supra note 15 and accompanying text. In Warrior & Gulf, the
Supreme Court stated that "[a]n order to arbitrate [a] particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be re-
solved in favor of coverage." Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
93. See United Mine Workers Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806,
811 (3d Cir. 1981).
94. See id.
95. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651
(1986); supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
96. See Communications Workers, 475 U.S. at 651.
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flexibility in resolving prospective application disputes, in accordance
with the greater role afforded the federal judiciary in arbitrability dis-
putes under Communications Workers.97 Because the Third Circuit's
standard effectively constricts the court's role, it should not be regarded
as the proper mode of judicial analysis of these claims.
C. Material Factual Identity Standard
The Fifth Circuit announced its material factual identity standard in
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl
Corp. 98 Under the Ethyl standard, the relevant provision of the collective
bargaining agreement is applied to the facts at hand to determine
whether the current conduct is arguably permissible under the agree-
ment.99 If it is not even arguable that the current facts fall outside a
prohibition or within an exemption of the article of the collective bar-
gaining agreement at issue, the defendant's conduct is held not to differ
materially from its prior conduct."°° If the defendant's conduct is not
materially different from the conduct that gave rise to the prior dispute,
the defendant is in violation of the prior arbitration award and ignoring
the arbitrator's coercive order.101
97. See id.
98. 644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).
In Ethyl, the union brought suit claiming that management had violated a 1974 arbi-
tration award prohibiting further "like" violations of Article XI of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. See id. at 1047. Management allegedly violated the award by placing
supervisory and salaried employees in hourly-rated positions. See id. The arbitrator had
awarded the union coercive relief in a prior dispute, ordering the company to desist there-
after from similar conduct. See id. at 1048. Having found the requisite arbitral intent,
the court focused on a comparison of factual scenarios to determine the propriety of
prospective application. A court "must devise a standard which enables [the court] to
assess whether the company is simply committing a 'like violation' of the previous award,
but which stops short of forcing [the court] to reach a decision as to whether the current
[conduct] actually violates [the collective bargaining agreement]:" Id. at 1050.
99. See id. at 1050.
100. See id. at 1051.
101. See id. The court presented the standard as follows:
I]n cases seeking enforcement of a prior arbitration award that expressly for-
bade 'like' violations of a prohibition contained in the collective bargaining
agreement, we feel the test that best accommodates the interests of the Union
and management is whether or not the current conduct is arguably permissible
under the relevant provision collective bargaining agreement [sic]. If ... it is
not even arguable that the current facts fall outside the prohibition or within an
exemption of the article in question, then a court can safely conclude that the
defendant's conduct does not differ materially from the previously condemned
actions and thus, that the defendant is committing a 'like' violation of the bar-
gaining agreement, in violation of the prior arbitration award. However, if the
evidence indicates that a defendant has an arguable position in claiming that the
current action does not violate the article in question-that the current conduct
is materially different from the previously condemned conduct-then the de-
fendant is not clearly sidestepping the prior arbitration award. In such a case,
the question whether the disputed conduct actually violates the collective bar-
gaining agreement (although a court has found it is at least arguable that it does
not) should then be deferred to an arbitrator.
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Under the material factual identity standard, the plaintiff must first
demonstrate that the defendant's current conduct inarguably falls within
the same prohibition in the article of the collective bargaining agreement
relied upon in the earlier arbitration award."0 2 If the conduct is not in-
arguably within the scope of the contractual prohibition, then the defend-
ant is not clearly in violation of the award. 103 The case should then be
remanded to an arbitrator."° If the plaintiff meets this initial burden,
the defendant must then demonstrate that his conduct falls within an
exception to or an express exemption from the contractual prohibition. 10 5
If the defendant cannot meet this burden, the court should enforce the
prior award prospectively. 106 Thus, the court will have determined that
defendant's present conduct does not differ materially from its prior con-
duct.107 If defendant succeeds in meeting its burden, plaintiff must
prove, once again beyond argument, that "the cited exception is a mere
pretext or is .. .otherwise inapplicable to the present situation."' 10 8
Plaintiffs who meet this burden should receive a prospective enforcement
decree.109 Plaintiffs who do not meet this burden will have their com-
plaint dismissed.1 10
The Fifth Circuit's material factual identity standard is the appropri-
ate mode of analysis for resolving factual identity in prospective applica-
tion claims.111 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Communications Workers, the Fifth Circuit's focus on contractual mat-
ters is wholly appropriate in determining factual identity. In Communi-
cations Workers, the Supreme Court encouraged contract interpretation
in resolving arbitrability disputes. 12 The Communications Workers
analysis requires application of the facts of a labor dispute to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to determine the parties' duty to arbitrate that
dispute.113 Similarly, under the Fifth Circuit's standard, a court should
interpret the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the
facts in the present dispute are "materially different" from the facts of
Id. (emphasis original).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 105 1-52.
105. See id. at 1052.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1206 v. Georgia Pac. Co., 798 F.2d
172, 173-74 (6th Cir. 1986); Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 491 (1st
Cir. 1983); National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 606 F.
Supp. 111, 114 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. International Chem.
Workers, 564 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (N.D. Miss. 1983).
112. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651
(1986).
113. See id.
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the prior dispute.1" 4 If the plaintiff meets his burden of proof, demon-
strating that the current conduct falls within that prohibition, the con-
duct violates the prior arbitration award.'1 5 The Fifth Circuit's reliance
on the collective bargaining agreement accords with the Supreme Court's
reaffirmance of the judicial role in interpreting collective bargaining
agreements in Communications Workers. 16
The Fifth Circuit's material factual identity standard is superior to the
Seventh Circuit's standard because it details a method of analysis for pro-
spective application claims. The Fifth Circuit clearly delineates the bur-
dens placed on the respective parties at trial.1 17 In Honeywell, by
contrast, the Seventh Circuit made no effort to detail its mode of analy-
sis; it simply held that the dispute in the case at bar was not "substan-
tially identical" to the prior dispute."1 8 By providing a detailed standard
of review, the Fifth Circuit has avoided the problems that the Seventh
Circuit's approach has caused.
The Fifth Circuit's material factual identity standard is also preferable
to the Third Circuit's "positive assurance" standard. The material fac-
tual identity standard is a strict standard, as it requires the moving party
to demonstrate that the facts in question are inarguably within a prohibi-
114. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981). But see Boston Shipping Ass'n v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981). The First Circuit adopts the
Fifth Circuit's standard and interprets it as though the Fifth Circuit did not require any
interpretation of the applicable clause of the collective bargaining agreement. See id.
This interpretation of the Ethyl holding renders the material factual identity standard less
stringent than it actually is. Under Ethyl, a court must interpret the agreement in an
effort to measure factual identity. In Ethyl, the court plainly stated that "a court cannot
assess whether the current conduct actually constitutes a 'like' violation of the collective
bargaining agreement without examining the collective bargaining agreement itself."
Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1051. This necessary measurement determines whether a party
is violating a prior arbitration award that provided for its prospective effect. Thus, it
appears that the First Circuit is incorrectly applying the Fifth Circuit's material factual
identity standard.
115. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1051 (emphasis original); accord National Ass'n of
Broadcast Employees v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 606 F. Supp. 111, 115 (S.D. Fla.
1984).
In a suit for prospective application the court is to determine whether the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement that were at issue in the prior dispute govern the facts
of the present dispute. See Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. International Chem. Workers,
564 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (N.D. Miss. 1983). If they are, the court applies the arbitrator's
interpretation of the clause in question prospectively, as the arbitrator had intended. See
Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1051.
116. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651
(1986); see also Note, supra note 17, at 1314 ("the Court's strong reaffirmation of the
quintessentially judicial nature of arbitrability determinations, with its concomitant
deemphasis of the presumption of arbitrability, suggests that courts should and will scru-
tinize contracts more attentively than in the past").
117. See Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1052-53; supra notes 102-110 and accompanying
text.
118. See United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, 1227
(7th Cir. 1975). The court failed to rectify this ambiguity in its reevaluation of the "sub-
stantial identity" standard in Inland Steel. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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tion of the collective bargaining agreement. 1 9 The material factual iden-
tity standard, however, is not as strict as the "positive assurance"
standard. 120 The "positive assurance" standard requires a plaintiff to
overcome a presumption against prospective application. 12 1 The mate-
rial factual identity standard, on the other hand, allows a court the flexi-
bility to determine for itself, based on the collective bargaining
agreement, whether the defendant is sidestepping the prior arbitration
award.' 22 The plaintiff's primary burden is to prove that the defendant's
current conduct is inarguably within a prohibition of the relevant provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement. 23 Having met this burden,
absent an effective evidentiary rebuttal by the defendant, the plaintiff
should receive prospective application. 24 Under the material factual
identity standard, a court should not presume that the dispute is not in-
arguably within the contractual prohibition. Rather, the plaintiff's evi-
dence should be weighed free from any presumption invalidating its
worth. The Court's reevaluation of the "positive assurance" standard in
Communications Workers, coupled with its reliance on contract interpre-
tation in the same case, demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit's flexible
standard is more appropriate than the Third Circuit's presumption
against prospective application.
CONCLUSION
If the federal judiciary is to apply the law in the area of labor arbitra-
tion in a consistent manner, it must adopt the material factual identity
standard in prospective application claims. The Supreme Court's con-
tractual perspective and the expanded scope of review of arbitrability dis-
putes resulting from Communications Workers have provided
management with an advantage in arbitrability disputes. A union's claim
for prospective enforcement of a prior arbitration award should be re-
viewed from a similar perspective. The federal judiciary should provide a
flexible standard for prospective application claims, and base prospective
application analysis on the interpretation of the parties' collective bar-
gaining agreement. Management's arbitrability disputes should not be
granted plenary review while a union's attempts to deter management
119. See Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d at 1051-52.
120. See Midwest Lodge No. 2063, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Admiral Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1563, 1566 (C.D. Ill. 1984); see also
District 12, United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 602 F. Supp. 240, 242-43 (S.D.
Il1. 1985) (plaintiff asks court to apply material factual identity standard and court re-
fuses, applying "positive assurance" standard, intimating that former standard places
lesser burden of proof on plaintiff).
121. See United Mine Workers Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806,
811 (3d Cir. 1981); supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
122. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644
F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).
123. See id. at 1052.
124. See id.
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recidivism are limited by the imposition of a presumption against the
union's cause of action. To ensure equal treatment of management and
labor under the law, the material factual identity standard should be ap-
plied in prospective enforcement proceedings.
Seth Michael Popper

